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Abstract 
In an open economy with common property resources at the community level, marriage and 
migratory decisions crucially depend on inheritance rules on the commons. Motivated by the 
traditional management of the commons in the Italian Alps, we present a model that fits the 
evolution of property rights observed over six centuries. Women’s rights over the commons were 
progressively eroded from the Middle Ages until 1800, when there was an almost universal 
adoption of a patrilineal inheritance system. Communities switched from an egalitarian system to a 
patrilineal inheritance system in an attempt to protect the per capita endowment of common 
resources from outside immigration. The model shows that inheritance rules have clear-cut 
implications for marriage strategies, migratory flows, and fertility rates. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations, women have equal rights to own property in 115 out of 193 
countries and equal inheritance rights in only 93 countries (less than 50%).1 This paper examines 
gender discrimination in property rights in traditional societies and in particular in inheritance rights 
on common property resources.2 So far, most scholars have primarily paid attention to inheritance 
rights in private assets rather than common property resources.3 However, community members in 
traditional societies often rely on a share of common property resources for their survival, which 
makes these rights crucial (Jodha, 1992). In particular, when a family’s subsistence depends on both 
private and collective assets, decisions to marry and have children are private but imply a public 
concern because they cause negative externalities regarding the collective assets. Because 
inheritance systems on the commons intervene in both decisions, they are important devices to 
reduce the negative effects of such externalities. We show that inheritance rights in these resources 
have deep implications for marriage strategies, migratory flows, and fertility rates. 
The contribution of this paper is to present a formal model to examine the implications of two 
distinct inheritance systems on the commons, one with gender discrimination and the other with 
egalitarian rights. The establishment of this model closely follows the field evidence provided by 
Casari and Lisciandra (2014), who carried out an investigation into the management of the common 
property resources of hundreds of small alpine communities in northern Italy between the years 
1200 and 1800. These communities belonged to the Prince-Bishopric of Trent, which is currently 
Trentino. Each community had the legal power to develop and enforce their own formal statutes. 
These documents aimed to limit the overexploitation of community resources, which mainly 
comprised pastures and forests (Casari, 2007; Casari and Lisciandra, 2011; Tagliapietra, 2011) that 
peasants relied on heavily for their survival due to the harsh environmental and climatic conditions 
in the region. The evidence shows a progressive erosion of women’s property rights that was 
especially exemplified by the narrowing over time of inheritance rights granted to women.  
Gender-biased inheritance systems typically take the form of a patrilineal system in which only 
sons can inherit the rights to exploit community resources and transmit them to future generations. 
According to the historical and institutional evidence, patrilineal systems emerged as a defensive 
measure to preserve the wealth of richer communities. Indeed, egalitarian inheritance systems, by 
promoting equal rights between men and women over the commons, caused migratory flows toward 
richer communities, which attracted men from poorer communities to marry more endowed women. 
The outcome, which occurred through the interactions of communities and individuals over the 
centuries, was eventually a convergence toward a gender-biased inheritance system. Initially, in 
1348, the patrilineal system covered 24% of the region that held a known inheritance system, and 
by 1801, this percentage had increased to 97%. 
In the wake of this historical and institutional evidence, the current analysis attempts to understand 
the underlying mechanisms of matching when potential partners are confronted with inheritance 
rights over the collective resources of their communities.4 Under what conditions are egalitarian 
inheritance systems conducive to migratory pressures toward richer communities? Are patrilineal 
systems an effective defensive measure to protect common resources against overexploitation? We 
attempt to answer these questions through a theoretical model of matching that is purposefully 
adapted to consider inheritance over the commons and migratory dynamics.  
                                                 
1 UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2011).  
2 For extensive surveys on gender discrimination in the inheritance systems of traditional societies, see, for example, 
Wedgwood (1939), Goody (1969), and Agarwal (1994). 
3 For the economic effects of gender discrimination on the inheritance of private assets, see, for example, Kennedy 
(1991), Kurushima (2004), Cooper and Bird (2012), and Kumar and Quisumbing (2012).  
4 For further historical evidence on marriage markets during the Middle Ages, see Botticini and Siow (2003), and for an 
extensive comparative analysis of marriage markets in traditional societies, see Botticini (2014). 
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We consider a two-sided matching model with no search costs and focus on the steady-state 
properties of a society where inheritance systems over the commons can take two forms: egalitarian 
or patrilineal. Endogenous population growth is set to zero, but each individual can freely choose 
both his or her spouse and in which community to live. Thus, population adjustments across 
communities can only occur through migratory flows. Every individual has the desire to get married 
and has identical preferences with regard to two assets: 1) a mobile asset consisting of the personal 
traits of the spouse such as beauty, temperament, health, and private resources, and 2) a fixed asset 
consisting of a share of the per capita collective wealth of the community in which one of the two 
partners is a member. The timing is very simple: individuals of the same generation meet, get 
married, and take up residence, and then a new generation substitutes for the older generation. The 
consequence of this system is that mate selection exhibits strategic behavior as individuals take into 
account the effects of their choice vis-à-vis others regarding which community to settle down in 
because their choices affect the per capita benefits derived from the commons. 
The role of inheritance rules of the commons on partners’ matching has not yet been investigated in 
the theoretical economics literature. The literature on matching theory is rather large, encompassing 
several subjects, and to our knowledge, no investigation has linked inheritance rules with the 
assignment mechanism in the marriage market, a fortiori this is also the case for the inheritance 
rules over the commons.  
The model predicts that when all communities adopt an egalitarian inheritance system, there is a net 
migration toward the communities with the richest endowments of per capita collective wealth. The 
consequence is a convergence across communities of their per capita collective wealth. However, 
when all communities adopt a gender-biased inheritance system, no net migration can occur, hence 
inequalities in terms of per capita collective wealth are preserved. Finally, when the two types of 
inheritance systems coexist across communities, migrations occur only if egalitarian systems are 
applied in the richest communities. These results confirm that egalitarian inheritance systems are 
evolutionarily unstable, whereas patrilineal systems emerge as an attempt to limit the size of 
communities and protect their members’ wealth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the literature on gender 
studies of property rights and matching. Regarding matching theory, we used only a few features of 
the previous theoretical literature due to the peculiar variables involved in mate selection. Section 3 
describes the importance of inheritance systems to migratory flows and fertility rates and 
consequently to community size. Section 4 presents the theoretical model under three different 
scenarios: communities with only patrilineal inheritance systems for their collective resources, 
communities with only egalitarian inheritance systems, and communities with different inheritance 
systems that coexist. Finally, section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
2 .Literature review 
This paper contributes to the literature on gender studies of property rights and the literature on 
matching theory. Gender scholars of property rights have debated at length about the gendered 
nature of access to and control of property rights. Boserup (1970) argues that the form in which 
agriculture was traditionally practiced in pre-industrial societies gave rise to gender roles, which 
eventually determined male control over the resources. In particular, the biology-based division of 
labor yielded cultural beliefs and norms on property rights that persist today, especially in less 
advanced societies. Alesina et al. (2013) provide evidence for this argument, namely that current 
differences in gender attitudes and female behavior are rooted in differences in traditional 
agricultural practices. Similarly, but with the opposite outcome, other examples show how women 
gained access to property rights because of their comparative advantages in work specialization. 
According to Agarwal (1994), the old female-biased system within the Garos ethnic group in 
northeastern India is explained by the fact that women played a major role in crop production and 
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the gathering of forest produce. Similarly, Fleck and Hanssen (2009) find that the inheritance 
system for private land in ancient Sparta mirrored the labor specialization system. However, as 
Humphries (1987) notes, the need for human muscle power in pre-industrial societies became 
increasingly less important after the industrial revolution; thus, the biological argument in some 
circumstances could be less explanatory of the persisting, or even increasing, sexual segregation in 
production processes. Therefore, cultural beliefs could provide a better account of sexual 
disparities.5  
Gender discrimination in property rights can be of two types: de jure and de facto. In particular, 
women’s access to resources for their household’s productive and reproductive activities is more 
prevalent than their control over such resources (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997). In many traditional 
societies, women gain (de facto) access and use rights to land indirectly through their husbands or 
fathers. However, the actual (de jure) control of land by women is seen as a productivity-enhancing 
factor (Agarwal, 1994). According to Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997), securing land rights for women in 
traditional societies was and is still critical to promote long-term investment in land and thus to 
increase agricultural productivity and development. Geddes and Lueck (2002) provide theoretical 
support for this argument: women’s inability to own and control property produces suboptimal 
effort, and this inefficiency increases with higher levels of capital. From this perspective, 
inheritance has crucial importance because it is still the most common way to acquire control over 
property, especially in Africa. Unfortunately, women’s inheritance rights to land are commonly 
denied with the justification that the husband’s family would eventually control the land (Lastarria-
Cornhiel, ibid.). 
Although the argument appears to be important, no theoretical model has analyzed the economic 
effects of discriminatory gender practices on inheritance systems. As outlined in the introduction, 
we attempt to fill this gap by providing an economic reason for gender discrimination in property 
rights during the Middle Ages. It is worth noting that the explanation we provide for gender 
discrimination is gender neutral. A matrilineal system in which property rights are allocated to 
women and intergenerationally through women would have served the same purposes as a 
patrilineal system, that is, preventing migratory flows toward rich communities and reducing the 
incentives for endogenous population growth. Though very rare, there are accounts of cases of 
matrilineal inheritance in Sumatra (Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2001; Quisumbing et al., 2001), in 
central and southern Malawi, especially within the Chewa group (Hansen et al., 2005; Takane, 
2008), and within the old Garos ethnic group in India (Agarwal, 1994).6  
This investigation is also related to another strand of literature referred to as matching models and 
marriage theories, which examines the problem of mate selection.7 This subject commonly revolves 
around three main issues. 1) An inherent problem of matching/marriage is the assignment 
mechanism among individuals, namely, how they meet and become mates. 2) Individuals’ utility 
can be transferable to their partner or not transferable. A transferable utility means that a unique 
output measure can be associated with each marriage such that utility can be redistributed among 
the partners to compensate for their actions or traits. With no transferable utilities, a partner’s traits 
determine an outcome that cannot be modified to compensate partners with deficient traits. 3) The 
                                                 
5 Humphries (1990) and King (1991) also consider cases in which women were the primary exploiters of common 
resources through their customary activities (e.g., gathering, scavenging, gleaning, harvesting, processing) in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century England, but this relative advantage did not induce any remarkable turn in property rights 
entitlements. 
6 A matrilineal inheritance system should not be confused with the so-called uterine matrilineal system that exists, for 
instance, in Western Ghana, where land rights belong to males, but they are transferred through the female line 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Quisumbing et al., 2001; La Ferrara, 2007). 
7 Comprehensive reviews on the theories of marriage can be found in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Weiss (1997), and 
Browning et al. (2011). 
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existence of interdependent preferences between generations induces parents to care about the 
utility profiles of their offspring. 
The first theoretical examination of mate selection in a marriage is that of Gale and Shapley (1962), 
who present an algorithm in which each individual has a preference ranking among all potential 
partners, with no transferable utility. Complete matching arises over a finite number of rounds. 
Each round allows one sex to send matching proposals to the opposite sex, which are temporarily 
accepted and put on hold according to individuals’ preferences. This mechanism is repeated until no 
proposal is rejected. Convergence is ensured by the fact that no one can send more than one 
proposal to the same individual. One main concern of this and future investigations is the stability 
of matching, that is, two potential partners who eventually match with other individuals should not 
prefer each other to their spouses; otherwise, they would prefer to stay single. The market for 
marital partners is also analyzed as a linear programming assignment problem by Shapley and 
Shubik (1972) and Becker (1973, 1974a, 1974b), in which each potential couple can be ranked by 
each participant by pooling transferable resources and considering the rule of division of payoffs. 
Transferable utility is indeed a main ingredient of these types of models. For instance, when a rich 
individual who is not attractive marries a poor but attractive individual, the former compensates the 
latter for his/her deficiency. 
These initial frameworks have expanded to include different issues such as the role of pre-match 
investments (Cole et al., 2001; Peters and Siow, 2002; Peters, 2007; Nosaka, 2007), search frictions 
(Mortensen, 1988; Burdett and Coles, 1997, 1999; Shimer and Smith, 2000; Smith, 2006), 
household public goods (Lam, 1988), and risk pooling (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Rosenzweig 
and Stark, 1989). In particular, Mailath and Postlewaite (2004) develop a model in which 
individuals value their decisions about wealth, but indirectly they value some mobile asset (e.g., 
beauty, etc.) that has no direct impact on anyone’s utility or wealth and that is not necessarily 
productive but has some degree of heritability. Assortative matching by wealth is contrasted by how 
much importance is placed on the mobile asset for matching decisions, which could eventually 
cause a redistribution of wealth because rich individuals who do not possess the attribute would 
marry poor individuals to transmit the attribute to their offspring.  
We draw several elements from previous models of mate selection. However, the mating process in 
our model shows important differences because of the impact of individuals and couples’ choices 
on the per capita share of the commons, which is eventually a decision variable. Unlike Gale and 
Shapley (ibid.), we are not interested in the survival of marriage assignments but rather in their 
formation. As in Mailath and Postlewaite (ibid.), redistribution occurs through the mobile asset, 
which is included in the utility functions. Further, individuals only care about their own utility 
levels, regardless of their offspring. This rationale is important to the origins of the tragedy of 
commons, as highlighted by Casari and Lisciandra (2014).8 Further, in our analysis, individuals’ 
mating choices and couples’ settlement choices can have an impact on the utility functions of other 
individuals and couples. As shown below, mate selection is coupled with the choice of which 
community to settle down in with the partner. This choice eventually affects the per capita share of 
collective resources accessible to the couple. In other words, the choice of an individual affects the 
choice of other individuals in terms of mate selection and community settlement. Of course, this 
relationship also occurs in the opposite direction. The endogeneity of the per capita share of 
collective resources makes the analysis rather complex. 
                                                 
8 Institutions tend to regulate the commons to reduce the negative effects of individuals’ myopia or bounded rationality. 
Because marriage is a very personal act in one’s life, as well as having children, and because these life events affect the 
commons, institutions intervene to regulate even these personal acts. As noted by Oström (1990), communities have 
developed institutions over the centuries to ensure the efficient allocation of common resources. 
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3. How inheritance systems affect community size 
This section provides an explanation of the possible impact of inheritance systems on changes in 
communities’ population. Consider a society comprising K communities that are endowed with 
collective wealth such as pastures and forests (Wk, with k=1,..,K). Individuals, men and women, 
belong to one of the communities and care about the per capita collective wealth of the community 
and about the personal traits of their spouses. The members of a community that have access and 
inheritance rights to the collective wealth are called insiders. In an egalitarian system, both men and 
women can inherit community membership, transmit it to their offspring, and establish their own 
families with full rights to access the collective resources. In a patrilineal system, only men have 
these rights. Individuals from other communities are considered outsiders and have no access to the 
collective wealth unless they marry an insider.  
A simple example describes the possible impacts of different inheritance systems on the population 
of a community under scenarios of zero or positive population growth. One scenario considers a 
constant population over time, where each family has exactly two children, one son and one 
daughter (50% chance) or both of the same gender. An insider can marry another insider or an 
outsider; in the latter case, the new family decides which community they wish to settle down in. 
Because of such internal migrations, the population of a single community can vary, despite a stable 
population at the societal level. The extent of internal migrations depends on the type of inheritance 
system and the frequency of weddings with outsiders (“cross-weddings”).  
Consider a community of 100 families with relatively high per capita collective wealth and an 
egalitarian system. This “rich” community can attract spouses from poorer communities who want 
to settle there. If everyone in this community marries outsiders, the number of families in the next 
generation doubles (200). Hence, a community adopting an egalitarian system incurs the risk of 
halving its per capita collective wealth in a single generation. 
With a patrilineal system, the “rich” community will not increase its population even when 
everyone marries an outsider. When deciding on place of residence, women from the “rich” 
community will prefer to move to their husband’s community, where they have access to the 
common resources. Similarly, in a primogeniture system in which only one child can inherit access 
to the collective wealth, the number of families would remain constant at 100.9 In another system, 
which Casari and Lisciandra (2014) call the “soft patrilineal system,” only sons can inherit the right 
to access the collective resources, but if sons are lacking, then one daughter can inherit the right. 
This system yields results that fall between the others because the “rich” community can grow to 
125 families in the next generation. 
In the alternative scenario with positive population growth, the impact of the inheritance system is 
amplified. When each family has three children, the population of a community with an egalitarian 
system can potentially triple, from 100 to 300 (Table 1). This example illustrates the different 
incentives for migration in the various inheritance systems. 
Table 1. Community size within a generation and inheritance systems 
Inheritance system of a “rich” community 2 children per family 3 children per family 
Egalitarian +100% +200% 
Soft patrilineal +25% +62.5% 
Patrilineal +0% +50% 
Primogeniture +0% +0% 
Notes: The population of a community that is “rich” in terms of per capita collective wealth can grow because of immigration. Within one generation, 
if everyone marries an outsider and settles down in the “rich” community, the population can double with two children per family or triple with three 
children per family. 
                                                 
9 Specifically, a primogeniture system provides the right to inherit access to the collective wealth only to one son. If 
sons are lacking, one daughter can obtain the right to inherit the access. 
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The example described above refers to community population growth driven by migratory flows. 
However, inheritance systems on the commons also affect the level of endogenous population 
growth. If each family relies only on its own private resources, the incentive to have an additional 
child is lower than if families also rely on community resources because if a family’s subsistence is 
exclusively based on its own private resources, the family bears the full cost of having an additional 
child. If the family also relies on community resources, the cost of an additional child falls to the 
community at large. This externality provides a higher incentive to have an additional child. Thus, 
parents’ decision about their number of children is a private decision, but it becomes a matter of 
public concern within the community when families of insiders rely for their survival on the 
collective resources. Under an egalitarian inheritance system, “everyone born has an equal right to 
the commons,” which would “lock the world into a tragic course of action,” in the words of Hardin 
(1968). Hence, the community is confronted with a tragedy of the commons relative to endogenous 
population growth. A primogeniture inheritance system for the collective resources removes the 
tragedy of the commons because additional children do not impose externalities on the use of the 
collective resources. A patrilineal system attenuates the tragedy of the commons due to population 
growth by decreasing individual incentives to have additional children.  
Hence, population growth in a single community can occur based on a net positive immigration, as 
in the above example, and through endogenous growth due to fertility rates. The adopted 
inheritance system on the commons affects both the degree of net migration and the degree of 
endogenous population growth.   
4. A theoretical model of inheritance systems over the commons 
The following is a two-sided matching model with transferable utility among partners and no search 
costs. We study the steady-state properties of a society under two possible inheritance systems: an 
egalitarian system, where both men and women inherit access to the collective wealth of their 
community, and a patrilineal system, where only men inherit such access.10 The right to access the 
collective wealth is family based, that is, at least one family member must be an insider. Each 
family that has access to the collective wealth, called an insider family, owns an equal share, 
regardless of the number of members originally holding the right. Outsider families do not have 
access to the collective wealth of the community. Population adjustments across communities can 
arise because each individual can freely choose both his or her spouse and the community in which 
to live. Although considerations of endogenous population growth are relevant, in this model we 
focus on a zero population growth scenario.  
In the model, everyone has a desire to get married and has identical preferences, U=U(pi,wk), with 
regard to the personal traits of the spouse (pi) and the per capita collective wealth (wk). An 
individual i has either a high (H) or a low (L) level of personal traits, which represent in a single 
dimension such diverse aspects as beauty, temperament, health, and private assets (i.e., land owned 
as private property, houses, dowry, cash, gold, cattle, etc.). Personal traits move with the owner 
(mobile asset) but not the share of collective wealth, which remains in the native community. 
Everyone prefers high levels of personal traits for their spouse and higher levels of per capita 
collective wealth, that is, ∂U(.,.)/∂wk>0, ∂U(.,.)/∂pi>0. Ceteris paribus, individuals prefer partners 
from their same community (tie-breaking rule). 
What follows are the events within the model: 
1. Meeting: Individuals of the same generation meet   
2. Wedding: Individuals choose a spouse of the opposite sex 
3. Residence: Couples choose which community to live in 
                                                 
10 Soft patrilineal and primogeniture systems are not considered for simplicity. 
Matching 
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4. Parents die 
5. Children are born 
These events occur in the following way. Matching unfolds sequentially into small sets of 
individuals, called batches. Individuals meet (1), wed (2), and make residence decisions with their 
partners (3) within their batch; renewal follows. Matching proceeds one batch after the other. All of 
the batches are equal in size (4K individuals), and each batch represents the society at large in terms 
of gender, personal traits, and community. For simplicity, we consider males rather than females 
making proposals first in each batch. If the females move first, the results do not change. Further, 
individuals from the richest community necessarily move first because the other individuals may 
marry them and move to the richest community. Thus, no specific order of marriage proposals is 
needed. The match (wedding) between a male (M) and a female (F) requires the consent of both 
partners. Matching within the batch ends when all of the individuals are married.  
We assume that when matching, individuals are short-sighted in forecasting community 
populations. Namely, individuals cannot predict migration flows in subsequent batches. They 
choose their spouse and residence by strategically taking into account all of the choices of people in 
the same batch, but not the choices of people in subsequent batches. The model is balanced, 
meaning that the number of individuals in each community is a multiple of 4, and the initial 
population of each community has equal shares of genders and equal shares of personal traits by 
gender. The population is stable, as each married couple generates two children, one son and one 
daughter, one with low and the other with high personal traits, randomly. Eventually, within each 
community, children have an even distribution by gender and personal traits, regardless of the 
personal traits of the parents.  
In a community, the endowment of collective wealth, Wk, is exploited in equal shares by Nk families 
(wk=Wk/Nk). A family consists of a married couple with their children living together. Thus, the 
community population is 4Nk. Communities are ordered from richer to poorer based on the initial 
level of per capita collective wealth. Society as a whole has a constant population of 4∑ 𝑁𝑘𝐾𝑘=1  and 
a fixed collective wealth of ∑ 𝑊𝑘𝐾𝑘=1 .  
4.1. Communities with only patrilineal systems 
We now present the main theoretical prediction when all of the communities use patrilineal 
inheritance systems.11 
Proposition 1. Consider a random partition of families {N1,..., NK} and of collective wealth {W1,..., 
WK} across K communities. When all of the communities have a patrilineal inheritance system, 
there exists an equilibrium in which the communities’ size remains the same and therefore also the 
inequalities across communities in per capita collective wealth.  
Proof. See the appendix. 
In a patrilineal system, a man never moves into the woman’s community because men would lose 
their right to a share of the commons in the original community without acquiring insider status in 
the woman’s community. Even if there is a desire to move to communities with a higher wk, under a 
patrilineal system the individuals will never become insiders in the destination community.12 In a 
marriage decision within a patrilineal system, men only evaluate women’s personal traits, whereas 
women take into account both personal traits and the share of the collective wealth of their potential 
spouse.  
                                                 
11 We are able to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium but not its uniqueness. We identify a specific equilibrium 
when applying a matching that takes place in batches. Other matching procedures may generate a different equilibrium. 
12 Note that if women move to another community and marry an insider, they will not individually be insiders but will 
belong to an insider family. 
Renewal 
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The results of Proposition 1 are remarkable because they are achieved under complete freedom in 
choice of residence. The drivers lie in the incentive structures of the patrilineal system: people move 
across communities, but net migration in each community is always zero. If women marry into 
another community, a simple balancing argument requires that cross-weddings always come in 
pairs. For instance, consider two communities, 1 and 2. For every woman from community 1 that 
marries a man from community 2, it must be that a man from community 1 necessarily marries a 
woman from community 2. Hence, the population of community 1 will remain constant because 
women move to their husband’s community and men stay put, and so also for community 2. This 
result extends to societies with more than two communities. 
Corollary 1. Preference profiles with more weight placed on collective wealth than on personal 
traits induce cross-weddings but also “mix-weddings” between L-type males and H-type females. 
On the contrary, strong preferences for personal traits favor internal weddings and tend to keep 
women within their native communities. 
This corollary emerges from the proof of Proposition 1. The explanation is simple. As noted above, 
men only care about women’s personal traits. In each batch, MH (H-type male) and FH (H-type 
female) from the richest community always match together. However, ML (L-type male) from the 
richest community definitely prefers to marry FH from a poorer community. However, this desire 
depends on women’s preference profiles, which are assumed to be equal for every individual 
regarding how much weight they place on personal traits and collective wealth. If women prefer 
personal traits, FHs will stay in their community and marry a male with the same personal traits. If 
women prefer collective wealth, FHs will move to richer communities and marry local MLs. 
4.2. Communities with only egalitarian systems 
Compared with patrilineal societies, a society with only egalitarian systems may reach a quite 
different state in terms of net migrations and communities’ size. 
Proposition 2. Consider a random partition of families {N1,N2} and of collective wealth {W1,W2} 
across two communities. If  
- all of the communities have an egalitarian inheritance system; 
- there is sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth across communities; 
- the richer community has a sufficiently large population;  
- individuals have “intermediate” preferences (i.e., not too inclined toward collective wealth 
or, alternatively, personal traits); 
then there exists an equilibrium in which communities’ sizes change, and inequalities in per capita 
collective wealth across communities decline. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
Under an egalitarian system, people move across communities, and net migrations can occur. In a 
patrilineal system, moving to the woman’s community is never a profitable option. Instead, in an 
egalitarian system, couples from cross-weddings can choose to live in either the wife’s community 
or the husband’s community. They will choose the community with the highest per capita collective 
wealth. This opportunity breaks the balance that holds in a patrilineal system: cross-weddings 
always come in pairs, but the new families can all choose to live in the richer community. Hence, 
the population of the poorer communities declines, and the population of the richer communities 
increases. Consequently, the levels of per capita collective wealth across communities tend to 
converge.13 
                                                 
13 Another variation of the model is to consider a fully myopic matching with respect to the consequences that 
individuals’ matching choices have on migratory flows. In this case, we expect that convergence would occur more 
quickly than predicted by the proposed model. 
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Cross-weddings will occur between an L-type individual from a richer community and an H-type 
individual from a poorer community because in each batch, the H-type individuals from the richer 
community will marry each other. In their choice of partner, individuals are willing to make 
tradeoffs between personal traits and the per capita level of collective wealth of their potential 
partners. Moreover, an individual marrying an outsider takes on the responsibility of reducing the 
per capita collective wealth of his or her own community if the couple settles there. This result 
occurs because in the same community, other individuals of the opposite sex would lack potential 
partners, and they would consequently seek partners from other communities and bring them into 
their community. 
Cross-weddings and, consequently, migration can occur only if a double coincidence of interests 
takes place. On the one hand, an FL and an ML from a richer community should not consider 
collective wealth to be very important relative to personal traits because otherwise they would 
marry each other and leave the size of the community unchanged. On the other hand, an FH and an 
MH from a poorer community should not consider personal traits as very important compared with 
collective wealth, thereby formulating their interest to move to the richer community by marrying a 
partner with low personal traits. For this reason, convergence requires individuals to have 
“intermediate” preferences, that is, not too inclined toward personal traits or per capita collective 
wealth. 
A sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth across communities is necessary to 
trigger convergence. On the one hand, an additional family claiming rights to collective resources 
does not seriously threaten inequality levels existing across communities. This would encourage an 
FL and an ML from the richer community to marry an H-type individual from the poorer 
community and settle in. On the other hand, a large gain in per capita collective wealth would more 
than compensate for a reduction in the utility levels incurred by an FH and an MH when giving up 
an H-type individual from the same community and marrying an L-type individual from the richer 
community. Preserving the wealth ranking among communities if an additional couple settles down 
in the richer community is also eased if the richer community is large enough. If the number of 
families holding rights to the collective wealth is high, an additional couple would not imply a 
serious reduction in per capita collective wealth. 
To conclude, a net immigration into a community causes impoverishment in terms of per capita 
collective wealth. The magnitude of this impoverishment is wider for a small rather than for a large 
community. Marrying an outsider from a poorer community, who then moves to the richer 
community, can increase the population and cause a negative externality for all of the insiders, 
including the one individual who makes the choice. 
Corollary 2. Net migration is not affected by the ordering of marriage proposals. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
The picture may become complicated when more than two communities with egalitarian inheritance 
systems are involved. We therefore present the case for K=3. However, for simplicity, assume a 
large difference in per capita collective wealth among the communities. In other words, assume that 
for a large enough i, the inequalities W1/(N1+i)>W2/(N2-i) and W2/(N2+i)>W3/(N3-i) hold. Thus, 
any net migration from one community to another does not affect the ranking among communities 
regarding per capita collective wealth. This result also means that any couple choosing a cross-
wedding will always move to settle in a richer community, regardless of the choice of the remaining 
individuals within the same batch because further couples choosing the richer communities will not 
change the ranking. This assumption is rather painless, and it assumes that individuals are more 
myopic than in the previous situations because their choice of partner and residence does not take 
into account the possible externality on per capita collective wealth. 
11 
 
Proposition 3. Consider a random partition of families {N1,N2,N3} and of collective wealth 
{W1,W2, W3} across three communities. If  
- all of the communities have an egalitarian inheritance system; 
- there is sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth across the communities 
such that both W1/(N1+i)>W2/(N2-i) and W2/(N2+i)>W3/(N3-i) hold for a large enough i, 
with i being the net migration possibly occurring from the communities; 
- the richer communities have a sufficiently large population;  
- individuals have “intermediate” preferences (i.e., they are not too inclined toward collective 
wealth or, alternatively, personal traits); 
then there exists an equilibrium in which communities’ sizes change, and inequalities in per capita 
collective wealth across communities decline. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
The analysis of the conditions that lead to net migration or a steady state confirms the results 
obtained for K=2. The extension of the proof for a larger set of communities follows the same 
procedure; however, the proof cannot be easily handled due to the increase in the number of payoffs 
and the enlargement of the game tree.  
4.3. Communities with mixed inheritance systems 
The following proposition presents the analysis when egalitarian and patrilineal inheritance systems 
coexist. 
Proposition 4. Consider a random partition of families {N1,N2} and of the collective wealth 
{W1,W2} between two communities, one with a patrilineal inheritance system and the other with an 
egalitarian inheritance system. If the community with a patrilineal system has higher per capita 
collective wealth, then Proposition 1 applies. Otherwise, Proposition 2 applies. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
This Proposition shows that what matters for net migrations in a society with different inheritance 
systems is the system adopted in the community with the higher per capita collective wealth. We 
learned from Propositions 2 and 3 that net migrations are driven by inequalities in per capita 
collective wealth. However, if a rich community has a patrilineal system, women cannot attract men 
to their community from other communities, and, consequently, net migrations are zero. 
Conversely, if a rich community has an egalitarian system, it does not matter what system is in 
place in the poor community because nobody wants to settle there: women from rich and egalitarian 
communities attract men from poorer communities and become “devices” to achieve a wealthier 
life. 
5. Conclusions 
Through a model that fits the historical and institutional evidence, we show that gender 
discrimination in property rights could emerge for economic reasons. In an open economy where 
individuals can choose spouses and places of residence, we find that the types of inheritance rules 
for common property resources have clear-cut implications for marriage strategies, migratory flows, 
and fertility rates. In particular, we compare a patrilineal system with an egalitarian system. 
We show that when marriage decisions are private, the presence of common property resources can 
affect the dynamics of migration and consequently community size. A key factor is the type of 
inheritance system that exists for these resources. In a society where all of the communities adopt 
patrilineal inheritance systems, men will focus exclusively on women’s personal traits, whereas 
women will take into account both men’s personal traits and the share of collective wealth they can 
obtain through marriage. In a society with egalitarian inheritance systems, men and women will 
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evaluate both assets when choosing a spouse. Without changing residence, every individual 
marrying a person outside of his or her own community will reduce the per capita collective wealth 
of everyone living in that community. In societies where both egalitarian and patrilineal inheritance 
systems co-exist, what matters is the system adopted in the richest communities. The magnitude of 
migrations will also depend on individual preferences. We show that, ceteris paribus and regardless 
of the inheritance system, if preferences lean toward personal traits, then no cross-weddings will 
occur, and consequently, communities’ sizes will remain unchanged. If individuals give more 
weight to per capita collective wealth, cross-weddings will occur only with communities having 
patrilineal systems or, with mixed systems, when then richest community has a patrilineal system. 
However, no net migration occurs. Intermediate-type preferences, that is, not too unbalanced toward 
personal traits or per capita collective wealth, will cause cross-weddings independently of the 
inheritance system.  
More specifically, the model clarifies the conditions that can trigger net migration. First, the 
existence of egalitarian inheritance systems can trigger net migration. In the presence of mixed 
systems across communities, net migrations can only be induced when richer communities adopt 
egalitarian inheritance regulations. Second, the existence of the double coincidence of interests 
between individuals from richer communities who are poorly endowed in personal traits and 
potential partners from poorer communities who are highly endowed in personal traits can trigger 
net migration. On the one hand, individuals from richer communities who are poorly endowed in 
personal traits should find personal traits more important than a loss in the share of per capita 
collective wealth consequent to their action. On the other hand, the individuals from poorer 
communities who are highly endowed in personal traits should value the gain in wealth consequent 
to a marriage with a rich partner more than that partner’s personal traits. Third, the existence of 
significant inequalities in per capita collective wealth across communities can potentially trigger 
migratory flows among them. Inequalities set the level of attractiveness of richer communities for 
high-quality individuals from poorer communities. Fourth, the richer communities should have a 
sufficiently large population to trigger net migration: richer individuals may be discouraged to 
engage in cross-weddings if it would eventually cause serious reductions in their communities’ per 
capita collective wealth. 
The decentralized decision of marriage and choice of partner along with the decision of where to 
settle down can be at odds with the general interest of a community to preserve its resource level. 
Consequently, communities can decide to adopt a patrilineal inheritance system to deter a local 
woman from marrying a foreign man and taking up residence in her community. Thus, an important 
implication of net migration occurring in traditional societies where egalitarian systems exist is the 
gradual replacement of this system with a patrilineal system, which is evolutionarily stable. In other 
words, if all communities are characterized by a patrilineal system, the transition of a community to 
an egalitarian system can be very costly in terms of per capita collective wealth, other than the case 
where the community is the poorest one. On the contrary, if all communities have an egalitarian 
system, a switch of a community to a patrilineal system would not imply any wealth reduction. 
Actually, if the community is relatively richer than the other communities, the switch would 
preserve its wealth. Therefore, a locked-in scenario occurs once all of the communities introduce a 
gender-biased inheritance system.14 As shown by Casari and Lisciandra (2014), this scenario 
occurred during the Middle Ages in the Italian Alps, where communities autonomously, gradually 
and progressively replaced egalitarian inheritance systems with patrilineal systems, and no reversal 
occurrence arose until Napoleon’s invasion in 1796, after which a centralized regime was 
implemented. 
                                                 
14 Of course, a matrilineal system could have served the same purposes as a patrilineal system throughout the paper. 
Hence, all considerations regarding patrilineal systems readily apply to matrilineal systems. 
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The implications of the model are reinforced when endogenous population growth is possible. The 
decision to have children is private, but it has an impact on the community as a whole (Hardin, 
1968) because of the negative externality of appropriating collective resources. In particular, an 
egalitarian inheritance system on the commons sets the highest incentive to appropriate common 
property resources through additional descendants, and therefore fertility rates are higher. 
Consequently, the inheritance system over collective resources plays a role in the control of 
community size through two channels: marriage decisions and fertility rates. Gender-biased 
inheritance systems would then limit both endogenous and exogenous population growth within a 
community. On the contrary, egalitarian inheritance systems could jeopardize communities’ 
resources through demographic pressures, thereby providing an economic account, co-existing with 
cultural rationales, of the rise of gender-biased inheritance systems.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
The proof is provided for the cases K=2 and K=3. The proof for K>3 follows along the same lines 
of the proofs provided for a smaller set of communities; however, the exposition is long and 
complex, and it is therefore not provided. 
Case K=2. 
MH1 (H-quality male from community 1) would like to marry FH1 instead of FH2 because of the 
tie-breaking rule in favor of females from the same community when, ceteris paribus, the potential 
partners have the same personal traits. ML1 (L-type male from community 1) may attract H-quality 
females from the poorer community depending on the revealed preference profile (Table A1).  
Table A1. Revealed preference profiles with a patrilineal system for K=2. 
P1 P2 
H1 H1 
H2 L1 
L1 H2 
L2 L2 
Notes: Payoffs are ordered from the most preferred on the top to the least preferred on the bottom. For instance, an individual with profile P1 prefers 
H2=(w2,H), to wit, an H-type from community 2, to L1=(w1,L), to wit, an L-type from community 1. The opposite is true for profile P2. The 
preference profile depends on Wk, Nk, and pi.  
For a given difference in per capita collective wealth between communities, when the preferences 
are quality oriented (i.e., P1), FH2 prefers to marry MH2. Therefore, no one moves across 
communities. As the graph below illustrates, H1s would marry each other, FH2 would remain in 
community 2 and marry MH2, ML1 would then marry FL1, and finally, ML2 would marry FL2. 
 
 
 
When the preferences are wealth oriented (i.e., P2), FH2 has an incentive to move to community 1, 
and ML1 is happy to marry her rather than his potential partner in his community (i.e., FL1). 
Therefore, FL1 would necessarily marry ML2 because MH2 would prefer, ceteris paribus, an L-
type female from his community. The direction of the arrow in the graph indicates the community 
where the couple will choose to live. 
 
 
 
In both cases, neither community changes its size. Because personal traits are randomly assigned to 
children regardless of their parents’ quality, individuals in the next batches will behave in exactly 
the same way as in this batch. 
Case K=3.  
When considering 12 individuals to match in each batch from three communities, there are five 
possible revealed preference profiles (Table A2).15  
                                                 
15 If w1 = w2 or w2 = w3, there are two profiles, as shown in Table A1. 
1 
1 
L2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
H2 L1 H1 
M 
F 
1 
1 
L2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
H2 L1 H1 
M 
F 
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Table A2. Revealed preference profiles with a patrilineal system for K=3. 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 
H2 H2 H2 L1 L1 
H3 L1 L1 H2 H2 
L1 H3 L2 H3 L2 
L2 L2 H3 L2 H3 
L3 L3 L3 L3 L3 
Notes: Payoffs are ordered from the most preferred on the top to the least preferred on the bottom. For instance, an individual with profile P1 prefers 
H3=(w3,H), to wit, an H-type from community 3, to L1=(w1,L), to wit, an L-type from community 1. The opposite is true for all of the other profiles. 
The preference profile depends on Wk, Nk, and pi.  
Let us distinguish the five cases according to the preference profiles. 
P1. Individuals give the highest weight to personal traits over per capita collective wealth. Because 
H2 is preferred to L1, H3 is preferred to both L2 and L1, and FH2 and FH3 do not want to marry L-
types from richer communities. 
 
 
 
P2. Personal traits are still important, but not as important as in P1. H2 is still preferred to L1, and 
H3 is still preferred to L2, but L1 is now preferred to H3. Therefore, FH3 marries ML1, FH2 
marries MH2 within her community, and FL2 marries ML2. Because FH3 marries ML1, MH3 
marries FL3, and finally, FL1 necessarily marries ML3. 
 
 
 
P3. Individuals have intermediate preferences: H2 is still preferred to L1, but L1 and L2 are now 
preferred to H3. There are no differences in the predicted outcome of migration and matching with 
respect to P2. In fact, FH2 still prefers MH2, and FH3 prefers both ML2 and ML1 to MH3; thus, 
she would choose ML1. Then, ML2 marries FL2, MH3 marries FL3, and finally, FL1 marries the 
remaining male, ML3. 
P4. This revealed preference profile indicates preferences that are more inclined toward per capita 
collective wealth over personal traits: L1 is preferred to H2 and H3, although H3 is still preferred to 
L2. Therefore, FH2 (but also FH3) now prefers ML1. Consequently, ML1 can choose between FH2 
and FH3. Over several batches, we may expect the ML1s to marry either FH2s or FH3s half of the 
times each and MH2s to marry the residual 50% of FH2s and FH3s. The remaining couples are 
ML2-FL2, MH3-FL3, and ML3-FL1.  
 
 
 
P5. Compared with the previous profiles, this profile is the most inclined toward per capita 
collective wealth: L1 is preferred to H2 and H3, and L2 is preferred to H3. There are no differences 
in the predicted outcome of migration and matching with respect to P4. 
Community sizes remain the same in all five of the profiles. End of Proof. 
 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
L3 H3 L2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
H2 L1 H1 
M 
F 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
L3 H3 L2 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
H2 L1 H1 
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F 
1 1 1 
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Proof of Proposition 2.  
H1s would prefer their own types (same personal traits and community but different gender) and to 
live in community 1.16 Thus, matching choices would involve the remaining six individuals in the 
batch. The tree of the matching game is depicted in Figure A1. Note that ML1 has a priority in the 
marriage proposals because he is an insider in the richer community. The priority could also be 
given to FL1, but the results in terms of net migrations would not change. 
Figure A1. Tree of a matching game of 2 communities with egalitarian systems. 
 
Notes: This tree can be examined with reference to the first matching game, with 2N1 and 2N2 insider individuals in communities 1 and 2, 
respectively. Using several examples, we can elucidate the terminology. For instance, ML1-FH2(2) means ML1 marries FH2, and the couple chooses 
to live in community 2. Another specification, (N1+1,N2-1), is the number of couples living in communities 1 and 2, respectively, at the end of the 
entire game. We do not consider the options ML1-FL2(1) or ML1-FL2(2) because they are trivially less preferred by ML1. 
Through backward induction, we can find the subgame perfect equilibria. Consider the subgame 
ML1-FH2(1) (i.e., ML1 marries FH2, and the couple decides to live in community 1). The payoffs 
for FL1 and MH2 are the following: 
 FL1-MH2(1) FL1-ML2(1) FL1-ML2(2) FL1-MH2(2) 
FL1 W1/(N1+1),H W1/(N1+1),L W2/N2,L W2/N2,H 
MH2 W1/(N1+1),L W2/(N2-1),L W2/N2,L W2/N2,L 
There are three cases to be scrutinized. In the first case, there is a large difference in per capita 
collective wealth between communities; in the second case, the per capita collective wealth of the 
communities is rather close; in the third case, the per capita collective wealth of the communities is 
very close. Regarding notation, “” represents a preference between payoffs.  
1) A large difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W1/(N1+1)>W2/(N2-1)>W2/N2) 
FL1’s ordering:  (W1/(N1+1),H)(W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/N2,L) or 
   (W1/(N1+1),H)(W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/N2,H)(W2/N2,L) 
MH2’s ordering: (W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/(N2-1),L)(W2/N2,L) 
Whatever FL1’s ordering, both FL1 and MH2 prefer FL1-MH2(1). 
                                                 
16 Apparently, this result cannot be taken for granted because MH1 may have an interest in marrying FH2 as long as the 
number of insider families in community 1, which in this case would only be known after the entire game is played, 
would be lower than that arising when MH1 marries FH1. However, it can be easily shown that this circumstance never 
arises. 
ML1 
ML1-FL1 
ML1-FH2(1) 
ML1-FH2(2) 
(N1,N2) 
FL1-MH2(2) 
(N1+1,N2-1) 
FL1-MH2(1) 
MH2-FL2 
FL1-ML2(1) 
FL1-ML2(2) 
(N1+1,N2-1) 
(N1,N2) 
(N1,N2) 
FL1-MH2(2) 
(N1,N2) 
FL1-MH2(1) 
MH2-FL2 
FL1-ML2(1) 
FL1-ML2(2) 
(N1,N2) 
(N1-1,N2+1) 
(N1-1,N2+1) 
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2) A small difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W2/(N2-1)>W1/(N1+1)>W2/N2) 
FL1’s ordering:  (W1/(N1+1),H)(W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/N2,L) or 
   (W1/(N1+1),H)(W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/N2,H)(W2/N2,L) 
MH2’s ordering: (W2/(N2-1),L)(W1/(N1+1),L)(W2/N2,L) 
FL1 prefers FL1-ML2(1) if MH2 marries FL2, which is actually in MH2’s best interest. Thus, the 
subgame equilibrium is MH2-FL2, FL1-ML2(1). 
3) A very small difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W2/(N2-1)>W2/N2>W1/(N1+1)) 
FL1’s ordering:  (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),H)(W2/N2,L)(W1/(N1+1),L) or 
   (W2/N2,H)(W2/N2,L)(W1/(N1+1),H)(W1/(N1+1),L) 
MH2’s ordering: (W2/(N2-1),L)(W2/N2,L)(W1/(N1+1),L) 
MH2 does not prefer to marry FL1. Thus, the best available option for FL1 is FL1-ML2(2), which 
is compatible with MH2 marrying FL2. The subgame equilibrium is MH2-FL2, FL1-ML2(2). 
Now, consider the subgame ML1-FH2(2). The payoffs for FL1 and MH2 are the following: 
 FL1-MH2(1) FL1-ML2(1) FL1-ML2(2) FL1-MH2(2) 
FL1 W1/N1,H W1/N1,L W2/(N2+1),L W2/(N2+1),H 
MH2 W1/N1,L W2/N2,L W2/(N2+1),L W2/(N2+1),L 
Because it is always verified that W1/N1>W2/N2>W2/(N2+1),  
FL1’s ordering:  (W1/N1,H)(W2/(N2+1),H)(W1/N1,L)(W2/(N2+1),L) or 
   (W1/N1,H)(W1/N1,L)(W2/(N2+1),H)(W2/(N2+1),L) 
MH2’s ordering: (W1/N1,L)(W2/N2,L)(W2/(N2+1),L) 
Whatever FL1’s ordering, both FL1 and MH2 prefer FL1-MH2(1). 
Now we solve the entire game by taking into account the three cases arising from the subgame 
ML1-FH2(1). 
1) A large difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W1/(N1+1)>W2/(N2-1)>W2/N2) 
The payoffs for ML1 and FH2 are the following: 
 ML1-FL1 ML1-FH2(1) ML1-FH2(2) 
ML1 W1/N1,L W1/(N1+1),H W2/N2,H 
FH2 W2/N2,H W1/(N1+1),L W2/N2,L 
For FH2, ML1-FH2(2) is dominated by the other two payoffs. Thus, this choice can be excluded, 
and the equilibrium conditions are the following: 
if (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L), then ML1-FL1, MH2-FH2; 
if (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L), then ML1-FL1, MH2-FH2; 
if (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L), then ML1-FL1, MH2-FH2; 
if (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L), then ML1-FH2(1), FL1-MH2(1). 
In all circumstances, ML2 marries FL2. 
2) A small difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W2/(N2-1)>W1/(N1+1)>W2/N2) 
This case replicates case 1 except for the following: if (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and 
(W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L), then ML1-FH2(1), FL1-ML2(1), and MH2-FL2. 
3) A very small difference between w1 and w2 (i.e., W2/(N2-1)>W2/N2>W1/(N1+1)) 
The payoffs for ML1 and FH2 are the following: 
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  ML1-FL1 ML1-FH2(1) ML1-FH2(2) 
ML1 W1/N1,L W1/N1,H W2/N2,H 
FH2 W2/N2,H W1/N1,L W2/N2,L 
For FH2, ML1-FH2(2) is still dominated by the other two payoffs. Therefore, this choice can be 
excluded. For ML1, ML1-FH2(1) is preferred to ML1-FL1. Thus, the equilibrium conditions are: 
If (W1/N1,L)(W2/N2,H), then ML1-FH2(1), MH2-FL2, FL1-ML2(2); 
If (W1/N1,L)(W2/N2,H), then ML1-FL1, MH2-FH2. 
As expected, the subgame ML1-FH2(2) will never occur because FH2 will always be worse off. 
Further, even if there are two cross-weddings in the third case, a net migration will not occur 
because the cross-weddings balance each other. The only cases where a net migration takes place is 
when W1/(N1+1)>W2/N2, along with the conditions (W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and 
(W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L). We can finally depict four different equilibria in terms of matching:  
 
if W1/(N1+1)>W2/(N2-1)>W2/N2  and  
(W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L); 
 
 
if W2/(N2-1)>W1/(N1+1)>W2/N2  and  
(W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H) and (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L); 
 
 
if W2/N2>W1/(N1+1) and  
(W1/N1,L)(W2/N2,H); 
 
 
in all other circumstances. 
 
The equilibria where a net migration from community 2 to community 1 occurs are α and β. Thus, 
two conditions must be satisfied. First, the per capita collective wealth between the two 
communities cannot be very close (i.e., W1/(N1+1)>W2/N2), meaning that there should be a 
sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth across the communities. Second, there 
needs to be a double coincidence of interests in marrying each other for ML1 (i.e., 
(W1/N1,L)(W1/(N1+1),H)) and FH2 (i.e., (W2/N2,H)(W1/(N1+1),L)). If both conditions are 
satisfied as the batch is completed, insider families will increase by one unit in community 1 and 
decrease by one unit in community 2, causing a convergence of per capita collective wealth 
between the two communities. In the subsequent batch, individuals will take into account the 
number of insider families adjusted by the net migration. By generalizing the above procedure, the 
following diagram can apply (Figure A2): 
 
 
 
 
H1 L1 H2 L2 
M 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 
α 
γ 
δ 
H1 L1 H2 L2 
M 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 
β 
H1 L1 H2 L2 
M 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 
H1 L1 H2 L2 
M 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 
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Figure A2. Partners’ choice in an egalitarian system for K=2. 
 
Notes: Counter i represents the net migration occurring from community 1 to community 2 before a generic batch starts. Specifically, i identifies the 
number of additional couples preferring to live in the richer community and consequently the number of couples moving out of the poorer 
community. 
To this point in the analysis, we can easily observe that if equilibrium α arises, the next batch may 
show one of the following equilibria: α, β or a steady state (i.e., γ or δ). If equilibrium β arises, the 
next batch will necessarily show a steady state. If a steady state arises, the next batch will 
necessarily show a steady state. Of course, this holds ceteris paribus. 
Assume that w1 is higher than w2 to such an extent that W1/(N+i+1)>W2/(N-i), where i≥0 stands for 
the net migration occurring from community 1 to community 2 before a generic batch starts. Figure 
A3 describes individuals’ preferences over four payoffs that can affect the equilibria: 
A=(W1/(N1+i+1),H), B=(W1/(N1+i),L), C=(W1/(N1+i+1),L), and D=(W2/(N2-i),H). We have shown 
that L1s compare the utilities over the payoffs A and B. Instead, H2s compare the payoffs C and D. 
In more detail, depending on the revealed preferences, AB means that L1s prefer to marry and 
take H-types from community 2 to community 1, even if there is a reduction in per capita collective 
wealth due to the cross-wedding and the consequent behavior of the other agents. If the revealed 
preferences indicate CD, then the H2s would prefer to marry L-types from the richer community 
and move there.  
(W1/(N1+i),L)(W1/(N1+i+1),H) and  
(W2/(N2-i),H)(W1/(N1+i+1),L) 
NO 
YES 
i = i+1 
W1/(N1+1+i)>W2/(N2-i) NO 
YES 
i = 0 
Steady State: final number of 
couples (N1+i,N2-i). 
Steady State: final number of 
couples (N1+i,N2-i). 
23 
 
Figure A3. Map of relevant payoffs in an egalitarian system for K=2. 
 
Notes: This map holds if W1/(N+i+1)>W2/(N-i) for a generic i≥0. 
Following this line of reasoning, it helps to present the revealed preference profiles over the set of 
relevant payoffs that arise after playing a generic batch in Table A3.  
Table A3. Revealed preference profiles with an egalitarian system for K=2. 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
A  A A B B 
D B B A A 
B D C D C 
C B D C D 
Notes: According to the preference profile, the payoffs are ranked from the most to the least preferred. Given our assumption, the following 
inequalities hold: AD, AC, and BC. These profiles assume that W1/(N1+i+1)>W2/(N2-i) for a generic i≥0. 
Each set of real preferences may underlie different revealed preference profiles depending on the 
distance between the levels of per capita collective wealth across the communities. For instance, the 
only profile that is compatible with a net migration from community 1 to community 2 is P3. This 
profile implies that AB and CD, which are the conditions that give rise to the equilibria α and β. 
All of the other profiles imply a steady state. The preferences revealed by P3 are neither too 
inclined toward personal traits, as in P1 and P2, nor too biased toward wealth, as in P4 and 
especially P5. P3 represents an intermediate type of preferences, which implies a double 
coincidence of interests for L1s and H2s to marry each other. Finally, observe that, ceteris paribus, 
(i) the higher that N1 is, the higher is p(AB) (probability that AB),17 and (ii) the higher that (w1-
w2) is, the higher is p(CD). Hence, if the richer community has a sufficiently large population, and 
there is a sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth across the communities, then 
net migrations are more likely.18 End of Proof. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. 
Because the matching choice is reciprocal, no single individual moves first, but rather a potential 
couple. When ML1 moves first, he can choose between his potential partners FL1 and FH2.19 In 
                                                 
17 It holds that W1/N1 – W1/(N1+1) > W1/(N1+1) – W1/(N1+2). 
18 Consider also that the higher that W1 is, the lower is p(AB), which makes a net migration less likely. Additionally, 
as i increases, p(AB) rises, but also p(DC) gets higher and higher, which implies that net migrations become less 
likely, and at some point, a stationary state will occur, as shown above. 
19 We have seen that trivially, ML1discards the choice of FL2. 
A 
 
D 
C 
B 
L H 
W1/(N1+i+1) 
W1/(N1+i) 
W2/(N2-i) 
pi 
            wk 
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particular, if ML1 prefers FL1, the former is reciprocated by the latter because of the assumption of 
identical preferences; however, if ML1 prefers FH2, the latter may not prefer the former. Thus, this 
type of sequence gives the first move to both ML1 and FH2. In other words, FH2 may even move 
first if she definitely prefers MH2. Nonetheless, those who move first, either ML1 and FH2 or FL1 
and MH2, have the choice of the best matching. In fact, ML1 and FH2 have the choice between 
marrying a partner from their community or marrying each other. They move according to their best 
alternatives by predicting the choices carried out by those playing after them, so they can only 
adjust their choice on the basis of the choices carried out by those players who moved first. In 
particular, in equilibria α and δ, there are no differences in terms of payoffs between ML1 and FL1 
or MH2 and FH2, but this is not true in equilibria β and γ.  
ML2 and FL2 will never move first because if they did, they would necessarily marry each other, 
whereas if they were to move later, one of them could get a better matching by marrying MH2 or 
FH2, as in equilibria β and γ. However, if the conditions for equilibria α or δ arise, ML2 and FL2 
will necessarily marry each other, and whether they do so before or after the other players is 
irrelevant. Finally, no matter the choice of ordering for of choice of H1s, they will always marry 
each other. End of Proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
In Figure A4, we show the tree for the entire game by taking into account that MH1 and FH1 
necessarily prefer to marry each other. As for K=2, we assume that ML1 has the first-move option. 
Nonetheless, the same observations about the irrelevance of the choice of ordering in Corollary 2, 
which applies to the case of K=2, also applies to K=3.  
Figure A4. Tree for the matching game of 3 communities with egalitarian systems. 
 
Notes: This tree can be analyzed with reference to the first matching game with 2N1, 2N2, and 2N3 as insider individuals in community 1, community 
2, and community 3, respectively. Using several examples, we can elucidate the terminology. For instance, ML1-FH3(1) means that ML1 marries 
FH3, and the couple chooses to live in community 1. Another specification, (N1+1,N2,N3-1), represents the number of couples living in communities 
 
ML1 
ML1-FL1 
(MH2-FH2) 
ML1-FH3(1) 
ML1-FH2(1) 
α=(N1,N2,N3) ML2-FL2 
MH3-FH3 
(ML3-FL3) 
ML2-FH3(2) 
(FL2-MH3(2)) 
(ML3-FL3) 
β=(N1,N2+1,N3-1) 
FL1-MH2(1) 
FL1-MH3(1) 
MH2-FH3(2) 
(ML2-FL2) 
(ML3-FL3) 
 
ξ=(N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
ML2-FL2 
MH3-FH3 
(ML3-FL3) 
 
ML2-FH3(2) 
(FL2-MH3(2)) 
(ML3-FL3) 
 
γ=(N1+1,N2-1,N3) 
δ=(N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
FL1-MH3(1) 
MH2-FH2 
(ML2-FL2) 
(ML3-FL3) 
 
FL1-MH2(1) 
(FH2-MH3(2)) 
(ML2-FL2) 
(ML3-FL3) 
 
θ=(N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
η=(N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
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1, 2, and 3, respectively, at the end of the entire game. We do not consider the options ML1-FL2(1) or ML1-FL2(2) and ML2-FL3(2) or ML2-FL3(3) 
because they are trivially less preferred by ML1 and ML2. Matching under brackets (e.g., (ML2-FL2)) means that this matching will necessarily arise 
due to the matching choices of the players playing first. 
From Figure A4, four different outcomes in terms of net migration among the three communities 
originate from seven different equilibria: 
1. (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
2. (N1+1,N2-1,N3) 
3. (N1,N2+1,N3-1) 
4. (N1,N2,N3) 
The last outcome is the steady state, whereas the first three outcomes allow for a net migration from 
a poorer community to a richer community at the end of the batch. The payoffs over which 
individuals express their preferences are depicted in Figure A5. 
Figure A5. Map of the relevant payoffs in an egalitarian system with K=3. 
 
Notes: The arrows between payoffs indicate the relevant comparisons carried out by individuals. The level of collective wealth W3/(N3-1) is not 
included in the relevant payoffs for this map because it is not compared by the individuals who are relevant for the matching choices. 
The map in Figure A5 is derived by solving the game in Figure A4 through a backward induction 
procedure. For the sake of simplicity, notice that Figures A4 and A5 and the analysis that follows 
depict potential outcomes of the first batch or later batches in which N1, N2, and N3 include changes 
in population due to net migration if it occurred. Following the game tree in Figure A4, ML1 can 
choose between three types of matching: ML1-FL1, ML1-FH2(1), and ML1-FH3(1). 
First consider the subgame ML1-FL1. As a consequence of the matching of ML1-FL1, MH2 and 
FH2 will necessarily prefer to match with each other. It is easy to check that the relevant 
comparisons for ML2 are between R and E and for FH3 are between J and S. Thus, the equilibria in 
this subgame are:  
1) If RE and JS, then ML2 will marry FH3 and move to community 2 (equilibrium β); 
2) If RE or JS, then there will only be weddings among partners of the same community, 
and no net migration between communities 2 and 3 takes place (equilibrium α). 
Now consider the subgame ML1-FH2(1). FL1 can choose to match with MH2 or MH3. In the 
former case, ML2 and FH3 can match either with each other or with partners from their same 
community. As in any other matching choice, a cross-wedding needs a double coincidence of 
A 
L H pi 
W1/N1 
           wk 
W1/(N1+1) 
W2/(N2-1) 
W2/N2 
W2/(N2+1) 
W3/N3 
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E G 
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preferences, but this only arises if GD and ES (i.e., equilibrium δ).20 Given the choice of this 
further node, the equilibria in this subgame will be: 
1) if BG, then the matching choices will be FL1-MH3(1) and MH2-FH3(2) and consequently 
ML2-FL2 and ML3-FL3 (equilibrium ξ);  
2) if BG, GD, and ES, then the matching choices will be FL1-MH2(1) and ML2-FH3(2) 
and consequently FL2-MH3(2) and ML3-FL3 (equilibrium δ); 
3) if BG and GD or ES, then the matching choice will be FL1-MH2(1), and the remaining 
matching choices are no mix and no cross (equilibrium γ). 
Finally, consider the subgame ML1-FH3(1). In this case, the choice pertains to FL1 and MH2, who 
can either marry each other or not. The equilibria in this subgame will be: 
1) if BG, then the matching choice will be FL1-MH2(1) and consequently FH2-MH3(2), 
ML2-FL2, and ML3-FL3 (equilibrium θ); 
2) if BG, then the matching choices will be FL1-MH3(1) and MH2-FH2, and consequently 
the remaining matching choices are no mix and no cross (equilibrium η).  
Now, we solve the entire game. In other words, we need to understand which choice will be carried 
out by ML1 and correspondingly by FH2 and FH3 in the primary node, given the equilibria in the 
subgames. We can distinguish between six possible comparisons among equilibria: α-γ-θ, β-γ-θ, α-
δ-θ, β-δ-θ, α-ξ-η, β-ξ-η.21 According to the preference profiles over the set of 9 relevant payoffs, as 
depicted in Figure A5, one of the seven equilibria will be reached. These profiles should follow 
several relevant conditions derived by our assumptions: CB, GE, RJ, ABDEJ, and 
CGRS. Given these assumptions, there are 76 different profiles for the revealed preferences 
over the 9 payoffs. Table A4 describes the conditions for the preferences that lead to each 
equilibrium and the corresponding outcome in terms of net migrations across communities. 
Table A4. Equilibria and net migration outcomes according to the preference profiles. 
Comparison Set Preference Conditions Equilibrium Net migration 
α-γ-θ 
RE or JS 
GD or ES 
BG 
AC α (N1,N2,N3) 
CA γ or θ (N1+1,N2-1,N3) or (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
β-γ-θ 
RE and JS 
GD or ES 
BG 
AC β (N1,N2+1,N3-1) 
CA γ or θ (N1+1,N2-1,N3) or (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
α-δ-θ 
RE or JS 
GD and ES 
BG 
AC α (N1,N2,N3) 
CA δ or θ (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
β-δ-θ 
RE and JS 
GD and ES 
BG 
AC β (N1,N2+1,N3-1) 
CA δ or θ (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
α-ξ-η RE or JS BG 
AC 
α (N1,N2,N3) 
CA BS BS η (N1+1,N2,N3-1) 
β-ξ-η RE and JS BG 
AC β (N1,N2+1,N3-1) 
CA BR η (N1+1,N2,N3-1) BR ξ or η 
                                                 
20 Note that unlike the subgame derived from the choice ML1-FL1, where no migration has already occurred before 
ML2 and FH3 decide whom to marry, in this subgame, MH2 and FH2 have already moved to community 1, thereby 
reducing the number of insider families in community 2 by one unit.  
21 No other comparison among equilibria is possible given the preferences over the payoffs. 
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The equilibria that lead to net migration are β, γ, θ, δ, ξ, and η, and there are 50 overall preference 
profiles leading to these equilibria. The remaining 26 preference profiles lead to the steady-state 
equilibrium α. In particular, the equilibrium α requires that AC and that RE and JS should not 
hold contemporaneously. However, four of the profiles leading to the steady state satisfy the 
conditions CA and BS. These last profiles give weight, more than any of the other profiles, to 
personal traits. However, the profiles that are more oriented to collective wealth, such as AC, 
DG, ER, and JS, also lead to the steady state. This result shows that the preference profiles that 
lead to net migration are not too inclined toward wealth or personal traits. 
In the subsequent batches, a net migration will evolve in a steady state in the following way. If the 
outcomes are (N1+1,N2,N3-1) and (N1+1,N2-1,N3) (i.e., equilibria γ, θ, δ, ξ, and η), the probability 
p(CA) will be strengthened, as will the probabilities p(GB) and p(SB), which will eventually 
lead to the comparison set α-ξ-η and so to α. If the initial outcome is (N1,N2+1,N3-1) (i.e., β), the 
probabilities p(BG) and p(JS) will increase, which will lead to the comparison sets α-γ-θ or α-δ-
θ, and because p(AC) remains unchanged, the final outcome will be the steady state. 
Finally, consider the conditions leading to the steady state. If the probability p(AC) decreases, or 
the joint probability p(RE) and p(JS) increases, then the probability for a net migration increases. 
The probability p(AC) decreases if the difference (W1/N1)-(W1/(N1+1)) gets lower. In particular, 
this result occurs with a high N1. Further, the joint probability p(RE) and p(JS) increases if the 
difference (W2/N2-W3/N3) gets lower and N2 gets higher. Hence, if the richer community has a 
sufficiently large population, and there is sufficiently high inequality in per capita collective wealth 
across the communities, then net migrations are more likely. End of Proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  
This proof is divided into two cases. The first case involves two communities in which the richer 
community in terms of per capita collective wealth has a patrilineal system, whereas the poorer 
community has an egalitarian system, and vice versa for the second case. The same observations in 
the previous propositions regarding matching and ordering also apply to this proposition. 
Case 1. Following the matching game within a single batch, H1s marry each other, and ML1 would 
like to marry an H-type female, but one is only available from community 2. Their options in terms 
of matching and potential payoffs are described as follows: 
 ML1-FL1 ML1-FH2(1) ML1-FH2(2) 
ML1 W1/N1,L W1/N1,H W2/(N2+1),H 
FH2 W2/N2,H W1/N1,L W2/(N2+1),L 
Note that when ML1 marries FH2 and the couple moves to community 1, MH2 will prefer, ceteris 
paribus, FL2 rather than FL1. The same consideration holds when the potential couple ML1-FH2 
moves to community 2. However, FH2 will never choose to marry ML1 and move to community 2 
because in this case, her payoff is always dominated. Thus, if (W1/N1,L)(W2/N2,H), then FH2 is 
happy to marry ML1 and move to community 1; otherwise, she will marry within her community. 
In both cases, there will never be a net migration from one community to another. 
Case 2. The proof is the same as that where both communities have an egalitarian system, except 
for the node where ML1 moves to community 2 after marrying FH2. However, as shown in the 
proof for Proposition 2, this node will never be chosen by FH2. End of Proof. 
